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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2018

TAGS: [KACT](#) [PARM](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [INF](#) [US](#) [RS](#) [UP](#) [BO](#) [KZ](#)

SUBJECT: JCIC-XXXIII: (U) HEADS OF DELEGATION MEETING ON
THE RS-24 PROTOTYPE ICBM AND PEACEKEEPER SILO CONVERSIONS,
NOVEMBER 14, 2008 CLASSIFICATION: SECRET

REF: A. STATE 87779 ANC-STR 08-660/3 (U.S. NRRC
NOTIFICATION PK SILO CONVERSION)
[1](#)B. RUSSIAN AIDE-MEMOIRE ON RE-DESIGNATION OF
PEACEKEEPER SILO LAUNCHERS OCTOBER 20
2008 (NO REPORTING CABLE)

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, United States Representative
to the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
Reasons: 1.5(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (U) This is JCIC-XXXIII-011.

[1](#)2. (U) Meeting Date: November 14, 2008
Time: 3:30 P.M. - 5:00 P.M.
Place: Russian Mission, Geneva

SUMMARY

[1](#)3. (S) A Heads of Delegation Meeting (HOD) was held at the
Russian Mission on November 14, 2008, to discuss U.S.
conversion of Peacekeeper (PK) ICBM silo launchers into
Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers and, U.S. concerns
regarding Russia's declaration of the RS-24 ICBM prototype as
a new type of mobile ICBM. All Parties were present.

[1](#)4. (S) The Russian Delegation began by conveying Russia's
concerns that the procedure used to notify Russia that 50 PK
ICBM silo launchers had been converted to Minuteman III ICBM
silo launchers were not in accordance with the Treaty. Also,
results of an inspection at F. E. Warren ICBM Base increased
Russian concerns and created doubt as to whether the
conversion process had taken place. Russian inspectors
viewed the interior of a silo launcher and observed elements
of the silo launcher that it believed were characteristics of
a PK ICBM silo launcher. The U.S. side responded that it was
still studying the issue, and would take the information
provided by Russia back to Washington.

¶5. (S) The U.S. side outlined U.S. concerns regarding Russian plans to declare the RS-24 prototype ICBM as a new type. The U.S. side explained that the original SS-25 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) data had been changed when the RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) was declared. All of the data available to the United States indicated that the RS-24 was very similar to the RS-12M Variant 2. The United States questioned the Russian Federation's Treaty basis for using the original versus updated MOU data as criteria for declaring the RS-24 as a new type of ICBM. The Russian Delegation said its response to this question has not changed; however, requested a written copy of the points expressed by the U.S. Delegation to bring back to Moscow.

PK SILO CONVERSION: A VIRTUAL REALITY

¶6. (S) Kashirin opened the HOD meeting at the Russian Mission on November 14, 2008, and clarified Russian concerns regarding a notification provided by the United States dated August 15, 2008 (Ref A), declaring that 50 PK silo launchers had been converted to Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers. These actions by the United States are contrary to the Treaty requirements (Paragraph 7 of Article III of the Treaty and Section IV of the Notification Protocol). Specifically, the United States did not notify the Russian Federation of its intentions to begin the conversion process nor of its intentions to install an ICBM of a different type into the converted silos.

IF YOU LOOK AT THE TREATY

¶7. (S) Kashirin reminded the U.S. Delegation of U.S. obligations under the Notification Protocol. The Party carrying out such conversion is obligated: In accordance with (IAW) Paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Protocol, to provide notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of the respective process of conversion, of the intention to carry out such procedures; IAW Paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Protocol, to provide notification, no later than 5 days after the initiation of the respective process of conversion, of the date on which the conversion process began; and, IAW Paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, to provide notification, no less than 5 days in advance, of the intention to install an ICBM of a different type or a training model a different type in a silo launcher of ICBMs if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of ICBMs, the silo door was not removed. Russia provided an aide-memoire on September 2, 2008 (Ref B), conveying these concerns but had yet to receive a response from the United States.

SO WHAT REALLY HAPPENED?

¶8. (S) Kashirin then spoke about the results of a Reentry Vehicle Inspection conducted at F. E. Warren ICBM Base (September 19-20, 2008), which increased Russian concerns. As reported by Russian inspectors, a senior site official declared that modifications of the PK silos had not been carried out. Furthermore, the DTRA escort team chief explained that the 50 silos had been re-designated as Minuteman III Silo Launchers and authorities have this information. (Begin Note: Upon further investigation by the U.S. Delegation it was determined that the Wing Commander at ¶F. E. Warren actually made this statement during the pre-inspection procedures. End Note.)

¶9. (S) Kashirin stated that Russian inspectors viewed silo launcher P6 which formerly contained a PK ICBM. Russian inspectors were unable to see any signs that a conversion process occurred. In fact, the launcher still contained a PK canister; the launch canister was braced by elements of the

suspension system. (Note: The canister mentioned is actually a large sleeve placed within the PK silo to enable cold launch of the ICBM. End Note.) The upper portion of the metal shaft of the silo had been removed, which is a characteristic feature of a PK ICBM silo launcher. (Begin Note: PK silos were originally Minuteman silos. Prior to START Treaty entry into force the USAF modified 50 Minuteman silos to accommodate PK ICBMs by removing a portion of the upper silo. End Note.) Therefore, Kashirin concluded, no conversion took place and the virtual declaration to Minuteman III ICBM silo launchers occurred in violation of the Treaty. Kashirin asked for an explanation.

¶10. (S) Taylor responded that the United States understood and that it was still studying the issue. Taylor said that the new information presented by the Russian side would be included in the U.S. evaluation of this issue.

THE RS-24 IS AN SS-27
ONLY IF YOU USE LOGIC

¶11. (S) Taylor stated that although the Russian Delegation had provided some additional information during previous JCIC sessions, the United States continued to have concerns with respect to Russia's declaration of a prototype as a new type of mobile ICBM and how the provisions of the Treaty would be applied to that missile once declared to be a new type missile. With recent statements in the Russian press by the Chief Designer of the RS-24 ICBM, Yuri Solomonov, indicating that the RS-24 ICBM will enter service in 2009, the United States continued to seek additional information regarding Russian Federation plans for the testing and deployment of the RS-24.

¶12. (S) With respect to the Russian statement that the RS-24 will be a new type of missile, and based upon the information provided by the Russian Federation to date, the United States did not see how the RS-24 ICBM could be sufficiently different from the current MOU data for the RS-12M to qualify as a new type. This was further reinforced by the fact that the acceleration profiles provided by the Russian Federation for the flight tests of the RS-12M Variant 2 and the RS-24 appeared to be very similar.

¶13. (S) Considering that the Russian Federation changed the size criteria for the RS-12M in JCIC Agreement Number 22 in 1994 and its throw-weight in 1999, all of which comprises the current MOU data for the RS-12M, the United States would like to better understand the Russian Federation's Treaty basis for using the initial MOU data declared for the RS-12M as the criteria for declaration of a new type of ICBM.

¶14. (S) The United States also urged the Russian Federation to provide additional information regarding the physical differences between the prototype RS-24 ICBM and the SS-27 ICBM beyond the transport cap being painted red and an "identifier" placed on the left side instead of a unique identifier on the right side of the missile canister so that U.S. inspectors and monitors can differentiate between the two missiles when the missiles are in an operational versus a transport configuration.

¶15. (S) Additionally, the United States previously informed the Russian Delegation that the current MOU photographs of the SS-27 ICBM in its launch canister no longer corresponded to the configuration of these missiles as they currently exited Votkinsk and requested more updated MOU photographs to better assist U.S. monitors and inspectors in differentiating RS-24 and SS-27 ICBMs in the future. However, updated MOU photographs had not yet been received.

¶16. (C) The United States looked forward to receiving additional information regarding these concerns and were prepared to work with the Russian Federation to find ways to address these issues.

¶17. (S) Kashirin requested that the United States provide Russia in writing the U.S points presented during the meeting. Kashirin added that he would provide the U.S. comments to Solomonov (RS-24 missile designer) and everyone else concerned.

¶18. (S) Taylor agreed to provide the Russian Delegation with his comments.

¶19. (S) Below is the official translation of the points provided by the Russian Delegation on Re-declaration of PK ICBM Silo Launchers at Warren. (Begin Comment: The Russian Delegation paper was provided to the U.S. Delegation on November 17, 2008, and is provided for clarity purposes. End Comment.)

Begin text:

Official Translation

JCIC-XXXIII

Text of the Remarks
by the Representative of

the

Russian Federation at the
Plenary Meeting
November 14, 2008

Re-declaration of Peacekeeper ICBM
Silo Launchers at Warren

On August 15 we received START notification ANC-STR 08-660/3 from the United States of America through NRRC channels; according to that notification 50 Peacekeeper ICBM launchers are being reattributed as launchers converted for Minuteman III ICBMs.

These actions by the United States of America are contrary to the Treaty requirements (paragraph 7 of Article III and Section IV of the Notification Protocol).

Specifically, the U.S. did not notify the Russian side of its intention to carry out such conversion, of the initiation of conversion, or of its intention to install ICBMs of a different type in the converted launchers.

We would remind you that in accordance with the Notification Protocol, the Party carrying out such conversion is obligated:

¶1. Based on paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Protocol, to provide notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of the respective processes of conversion, of the intention to carry out such procedures.

¶2. Based on paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Protocol, to provide notification, no later than 5 days after the initiation of the respective processes of conversion, of the date on which the conversion process began.

¶3. Based on paragraph 3 of Section IV of the Protocol, to provide notification, no less than five days in advance, of the intention to install an ICBM of a different type or a training model a different type in a silo launcher of ICBMs if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of ICBMs, the silo door was not removed.

The Russian side presented its concerns regarding this problem in the document provided to the United States of America through diplomatic channels on September 2, 2008. However, there has thus far been no response to that document.

On September 19, 2008, the Russian side conducted a reentry vehicle inspection of deployed ICBMs at Warren Missile Complex ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, under paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty.

The results of that inspection only reinforced the Russian concerns. We are referring to the following.

During the pre-inspection briefing the senior facility representative responsible for Treaty implementation at the base stated that no modification of the Peacekeeper ICBM silo launchers at the base was conducted. This was noted by all the Russian inspectors. The senior escort, an official from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, noted in this connection that the U.S. side had simply "redesignated" these 50 silo launchers and that only the diplomatic authorities have complete information in this regard.

During the inspection of one of the launchers, designated on the site diagram of the base as R-6, which had previously contained a Peacekeeper ICBM, no signs were detected that any conversion work had been done on the launcher. In the silo the presence of a Peacekeeper launch canister was noted; the launch canister was braced by elements of the suspension system. The upper portion of the metal shaft of the silo had been removed, which is a characteristic feature of a Peacekeeper ICBM silo launcher.

Thus, the results of this inspection confirmed that there had been no conversion of the launchers in question and their "re-declaration" as launchers of ICBMs of a different type (Minuteman III) was carried out in violation of the provisions of the Notification Protocol and is contrary to the requirements of paragraph 7 of Article III of the START Treaty. In view of this, we do not understand what is meant by the following comment in the aforementioned notification: "Silo launchers for Peacekeeper ICBMs were converted to silo launchers for Minuteman III ICBMs so that they are now incapable of launching an ICBM of the previous type."

We would ask the U.S. side to provide appropriate clarification.

End text.

¶20. (U) Documents exchange: None.

¶21. (U) Participants:

U.S.

Mr. Taylor
Ms. Bosco
Mr. Brown
Lt Col Comeau
Mr. DeNinno
Mr. Dunn
Maj Edinger
Mr. Fortier
Mr. Johnston
Mr. Kuehne
LTC Oppenheim
CDR Rust
Mr. Smith
Col Summers
Mr. Vogel
Mr. Yaguchi
Ms. Gross (Int)

BELARUS

Mr. Ponomarev

KAZAKHSTAN

Col Akhmetalin

RUSSIA

Mr. Kashirin
Mr. Bolotov
Col Ryzhkov
Capt(1st Rank) Kuz'min
Maj Gen Nikishin
Col Novikov

Col Zaytsev
Ms. Komshilova (Int)

UKRAINE

Dr. Shevtsov
Mr. Bondarenko

122. (U) Taylor sends.
TICHENOR

NNNN

End Cable Text